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This paper develops a theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between 
public spending and economic growth, where public spending provides both productive capital 
and unproductive services. We take into account the quality of bureaucracy with the possibility 
of rent-seeking motives. A key feature of the model is that it distinguishes between utility 
enhancing and productivity enhancing public spending. In the absence of rent-seeking motives, 
the paper demonstrates that public spending will promote economic growth only if marginal 
productivity of spending is high enough to offset the potential output loss due to increased 
taxation. In the presence of rent-seeking, however, the impact of public spending on economic 
growth depends on the quality of bureaucracy and how the latter impinges upon the rent-
seeking behaviour. The analysis shows that while improvement in bureaucratic quality would 
unambiguously raise the share of utility enhancing public spending, its impact on economic 
growth would depend on how bureaucratic quality influences the relative magnitudes of the 
two types of public spending as well as on how far bureaucratic extraction will be controlled as 
a result of improvement in bureaucratic quality. Bureaucratic extraction is likely to be 
minimised with strong institutions and effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms 
thereby improving the prospects of economic growth.    
JEL Classification: C61, D23, D61, D73, H50 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The role of public spending in the process of economic growth has received a great 
deal of attention in the literature [see, for example, Barro (1990); Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992); Devarajn, Swaroop, and Zou (1996); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1997) and Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002)]. Most of the studies, however, 
ignore bureaucratic quality and the possibility of rent-seeking that is linked with public 
spending and provision of public goods. It is well known that public spending 
programmes can be used as a vehicle for rent-seeking which can adversely impact the 
effectiveness of public spending and hurt economic growth [see, for example, Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Tiongson (2000); Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobatan (1999); Mauro 
(1998) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)]. Our starting point in this research is to argue that 
the effectiveness of public spending depends crucially on the quality of bureaucracy that 
is responsible for administering the public spending programmes.
1
 If bureaucracy is 
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efficient with proper incentives for performance, it will tend to adopt public spending 
policies that can promote economic growth. On the other hand, as is commonly observed 
in many developing economies, if the bureaucracy lacks effective checks and balances on 
its performance, then the consequent lack of accountability makes government officials 
prone to abuse of power and rent-seeking from public spending projects which ultimately 
impede the process of economic growth.
2
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between public spending and 
economic growth while taking into account the quality of bureaucracy with the possibility 
of rent-seeking behaviour. In particular, we develop a theoretical framework that 
endogenises public expenditure policies in a setting that explicitly incorporates the role of 
bureaucracy in determining public spending. A key feature of our study is that it makes a 
distinction between productivity enhancing and utility enhancing public spending.
3
 The 
two types of public spending may have different implications for economic growth for at 
least two reasons. First, the two types of spending may influence productivity in different 
ways and thus may have different impacts on economic growth. For example, Devarajan, 
et al. (1996) find that growth increases with an increase in the current expenditures of the 
government while it declines with an increase in the stock expenditures of the 
government. This result questions the policy of giving more attention to capital 
expenditures rather than current expenditures especially in the context of developing 
economies. It is noteworthy that previous work has mainly focused on productivity 
enhancing expenditures and largely ignored the utility enhancing expenditures.  In this 
respect, our study makes an important contribution to the literature by incorporating the 
two types of spending in a rigorous growth framework.
4
 Second, the two types of public 
spending may entail different incentives for the bureaucracy in terms of opportunities for 
rent-seeking resulting in different growth outcomes.  For example, if bureaucratic 
extraction takes place in utility enhancing expenditures, growth may still be achievable if 
substantial resources are allocated to the productivity enhancing expenditures. So this 
type of extraction may be less harmful for the economy. On the other hand, however, if 
bureaucratic extraction takes place in productivity enhancing expenditures, it may have 
deleterious consequences for economic growth by stifling private activity. 
The analysis provides insights into how rent-seeking behaviour may impact 
growth outcomes of public spending programmes. In particular, the analysis points out 
what type of bureaucratic extraction would be more harmful for economic growth.
5
 For 
example if extraction takes place in utility enhancing expenditures then welfare of the 
 
2Keefer (2004) argues that in economies with bad governance, public spending is not deployed 
productively and is rather often used as an instrument for maximising rents by bureaucrats. So even if public 
spending is high in such economies, it does not necessarily mean that it is growth promoting because it may be 
wasted on non-productive activities. 
3Productivity enhancing expenditures include spending on public goods such as physical infrastructure 
while utility enhancing expenditures include social security programmes, income transfer programmes, and 
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4In the growth literature, the famous optimising models of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans 
(1965) are aimed at studying the required savings rate to put the economy on a balanced steady state growth 
path. However, these models are silent on the role of composition of public expenditures on economic growth. 
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bureaucratic rent-seeking in public spending policies as different types of public spending may entail different 
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citizens may be compromised while growth may still be achievable through productivity 
enhancing expenditures. On the other hand, rent-seeking opportunities in productivity 
enhancing expenditures may hamper economic growth by raising transactions costs of the 
private enterprises. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
literature. Section 3 develops the model while Section 4 discusses the key implications of 
the model considering a benchmark case when public spending is taken as exogenous and 
there is no rent-seeking. Section 5 introduces bureaucratic choice in the model to 
endogenise the composition of public spending in terms of bureaucratic quality and the 
associated issue of rent-seeking. Section 6 provides summary and conclusions. The 
appendix provides detailed derivations. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The literature that deals with the question of public spending and economic growth 
can be broadly classified into neoclassical/endogenous growth models, and the new 
institutional approach.
6
 The neoclassical and endogenous growth models pay scant 
attention to the material self-interest of key actors (e.g. bureaucrats) involved in the 
policy-making process. The new institutional approach takes into account the incentives 
and constraints faced by these actors that influence the public spending outcomes. This 
section provides an exposition of the literature in particular on two thematic areas 
including public choice and bureaucracy and institutional quality. 
Starting from the seminal work of Arrow and Kurz (1970), the growth literature in 
the tradition of neoclassical and endogenous growth models provides robust evidence of 
positive link between economic growth and public spending. In the neoclassical tradition, 
some authors follow Devarajan, et al. (1996) and explore the link between public 





 expenditures [Chen (2006); Ghosh and Roy (2004); 
Carboni and Medda (2011)]. These studies analyse optimal composition of government 
expenditures in a setting where public expenditure is composed of two types—one leads 
to growth and the other leads to welfare—and investigate which composition is optimal 
to maximise the long-run growth rate [Turnovsky (2000a)]. However, the growth 
literature pays scant attention to the quality of bureaucracy duly taking into account the 
rent-seeking motives which may contribute to wasteful public spending. 
In a departure from the neoclassical tradition, an influential strand of literature 
incorporates self-interest motives that determine the constraints and incentives faced 
 
6
Early neoclassical growth models envisaged no role of public expenditures in economic growth and 
instead emphasised savings rate and physical capital accumulation as the main drivers of economic growth 
[Ramsey (1928); Cass (1965); Koopmans (1965); Solow-Swan (1956)].  Arrow and Kurz (1970) first described 
the scope of fiscal policy within the neoclassical framework and since then a vast body of literature has 
explored the linkages between public spending and economic growth emphasising a variety of transmission 
channels [Barro (1990); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992); King and Rebelo (1990]. While the theoretical 
literature generally predicts a positive relationship between public spending and economic growth, the empirical 
studies have found mixed results. 
7See, for example, Barro (1990). 
8
Some studies argue that public consumption expenditures are always unproductive and hence 
resources should be allocated to physical capital alone. See, for example, Barro (1990), Barro (1991), Aschauer 
(1989) and Grier and Tullock (1989). 
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by key actors including politicians and bureaucrats who are responsible for devising 
and implementing public spending policies [see, e.g. Buchanan (1968); Carpenter 
(2001); Milward (1980); Rochefort and Cobb (1994)]. Following the seminal work of 
Tullock (1967) who first introduced the idea of rent-seeking, Krueger (1974) 
describes rent-seeking as the behavior of public officials acting as self-interested 
economic agents who try to maximise their individual gains which results in social 
losses. Pursuing this line of inquiry, the public choice paradigm explores how 
bureaucrats who are responsible for the implementation of public spending policies 
can be involved in rent-seeking activities
9
 [see, e.g. Hillman (2003), Chapter 6; 
Mueller (2003), Chapter 15, for a survey of rent-seeking literature]. Furthermore, 
dynamic growth models based on public choice approach provide insights into how 
public spending may lead to negative growth outcomes in the presence of rent -
seeking behaviour.
10
 A key point of this line of research is that inefficiencies may be 
explained by maximisation of personal gains
11
 by public agents [Mises (1944); 
Parkisnson and Osborn (1957) and Niskanen (1971)]. 
Following the arguments of Niskanen (1971), budget-maximising bureaucracy 
is shown to result in an overprovision of public goods,
12
 as bureaucrats try to 
maximise the size of budget. It follows that the growth framework with productive 
public spending in the presence of rent-seeking bureaucrats would result in sub 
optimal provision of public goods.
13
 Dethier (1999) departs from the conventional 
view of government officials as benevolent who seek to maximise social welfare to 
argue that government agencies are complex entities characterised by agency 
relationships. Efficient utilisation of public resources not only depends on the quality 
of institutions but also on incentive schemes in public organisations. Therefore, 
reforms need to be focused on designing appropriate incentive schemes that ensure 
effective implementation of policies so as to maximise social welfare. Such reforms 
would also ensure good governance that in turn would lead to better growth 
outcomes supported by physical and human capital accumulation and efficiency in 
the use of resources. Niskanen (1968) develops a model of the bureaucracy in which 
bureaucrats enjoy absolute powers and use their power to maximise their budget 
resulting in outcomes that are suboptimal from a social point of view.  
Several studies have extended Niskanen’s budget maximisation framework to 
incorporate more nuanced approaches for modelling the budgetary allocations, 
emphasising in particular the discretionary powers of bureaucracy [see, for example, 
Breton and Wintrobe (1975); Romer and Rosenthal (1978); Mackay and Weaver 
 
9See, for example, Evans (1989), Weingast and Moran (1983), Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), and 
Keefer and Stasavage (2003).  McNubbis, Noll, and Weingast (1987) describe in detail the bureaucratic 
discretion imposed by the US Congress through the Administrative Procedures Act. 
10Public choice literature that emphasises rent-seeking originated with the works of Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) and Olson (1971). 
11See Mueller (1989). 
12
Earlier studies that investigate the issue of overprovision of public goods include Orzechowsky 
(1977), Breton and Wintrobe (1975), Tullock (1965), and Romer and Rosenthal (1978).  
13Some authors have highlighted the potentially positive impact of rent-seeking on public goods 
provisions. For example, Rose-Ackerman (1996) notes that in the presence of rent-seeking opportunities, public 
officials are more motivated to maximise gains from public projects and thus generate aggregate benefit for the 
overall society.  
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(1981); Miller and Moe (1983); Conybeare (1984); Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 
(1985) and Bendor and Moe (1985, 1986)]. In an influential contribution, Migue and 
Belanger (1974) develop a model of bureaucratic discretion and argue that 
bureaucrats maximise their budget leeway, defined as the total budget less the cost of 
production of the bureau’s output. It is shown that the equilibrium output may range 
from the level of a profit-maximising monopolist to that of an output maximising 
bureau, depending on the bureaucrat’s utility from productive and non-productive 
spending. In any case the budget of a bureau is too large and the output is not 
produced at the minimum cost. 
The problem of rent-seeking in public spending programmes varies across sectors. 
Mauro (1998) argues that corrupt officials will choose to spend public resources on 
activities with greater opportunities to extract bribes. The study finds that rent-seeking 
reduces public expenditures on education as such spending is often more transparent 
leaving little room for public officials to engage in extractive practices. Building on the 
same line of argument Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) find that higher rent-seeking is related 
to higher public investment, lower government revenues, lower expenditures on 
operations and maintenance, and lower quality of public infrastructure. Moreover, rent-
seeking is likely to increase the number of large and more complex public investment 
projects because of greater rent-seeking opportunities associated with such projects. This 
is because more complex expenditures cannot be easily scrutinised by the public thus 
providing better opportunities to extract rents. The same argument holds for defense 
spending which is kept away from public scrutiny purportedly for security reasons.
14
  
Besides bureaucratic quality, the distortion in fiscal policy and development 
budgets can originate from many sources such as the nature of the political process, lack 
of transparency, and low level of public awareness of the budgetary process. A number of 
studies in the political economy literature have emphasised the role of the political 
process in generating sub-optimal public spending outcomes [Alesina and Perotti (1995); 
Eslava (2006)]. Furthermore, the politico-institutional approaches show that even in the 
democratic countries with accountable bureaucracy, distortions in the public spending 
can stem from lack of awareness by the voters that makes it easy for the bureaucrats to 
seek rents. This point has been highlighted, in the context of Pakistan, by Uppal (2011) 
who examines political institutions and budgetary processes that affect the fiscal policy, 
and shows how greater transparency and strong institutional checks and balances can 
encourage fiscal discipline [Ghani and Din (2006); Easterly (2001)]. 
To sum up, a rich body of literature has explored the role of public spending on 
economic growth. However, the quality of bureaucracy and the associated problem of 
rent-seeking have received little attention in the theoretical discussions that link 
efficiency of public spending to economic growth. Adding to this stream of research the 
present paper aims at investigating the impact of rent-seeking behaviour of bureaucrats 
on public policy outcomes, when it is assumed that public spending is composed of utility 
enhancing and productivity enhancing expenditures. In the next section, we propose a 
simple theoretical framework to explain how the quality of bureaucracy and the presence 
of rent-seeking motives may impinge on growth outcomes of public spending policies.  
 
14 See also Gupta, Mello, and Sharan (2001) for a similar argument. 
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3.  A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SPENDING COMPOSITION  
AND QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY 
The model is an extension of Devarajan, et al. (1996) in two ways. First, in 
contrast to Devarajan, et al. (1996) who distinguish between productive and non-
productive expenditures in the production function, our study focuses on utility 
enhancing and productivity enhancing public expenditures and examines how this 
composition of public spending impacts economic growth. Second, while Devarajan, et 
al. (1996) treat public spending as exogenous, our study incorporates bureaucratic choice 
in the model so that public spending policies are endogenously determined. The model 
developed here provides a simple framework to study the determination of sectoral 
composition of public expenditures and their impact on growth and welfare in the 
presence of rent-seeking bureaucracy. 
A representative infinitely lived household in a closed economy maximises: 
  ∫         
     
 
 
 … … … … … … (1) 
Where   is per capita consumption,    is per capita public spending on utility enhancing 
goods and services, and     is the constant rate of time preference. Population is 
assumed constant. 
Let the utility function be additively separable and logarithmic:
15
 
                  … … … … … … (2) 
Where     measures the weight given to public consumption relative to private 
consumption. 
Each household producer has the production function: 
          … … … … … … … (3) 
Where   is output per capita,   is private capital per capita, and    is per capita public 
spending on productivity enhancing goods and services. We assume such public goods and 
services are provided free of charge and there is no congestion. Following Barro (1990), the 
production function in the paper represents government expenditures as a public good into 
the production process. Here the idea is that public good characteristics of public 
expenditures raise productivity and hence boost economic growth. In the literature on 
public spending, both approaches are used by researchers treating public expenditures as 
stock variable
16
 [Futagami, et al. (1993) or flow variable
17
 [Barro (1990)] that directly 
raises the marginal product of capital. More specifically, the public expenditures are 
described as public capital and treated as stock variable where these expenditures solely 
represent infrastructure, which affects marginal product of private capital. In our case, we 
use public spending to represent the availability of productivity enhancing public goods and 
hence the use of flow variable is more appropriate.  Furthermore, if the public expenditures 
are introduced as stock variables then the analysis becomes more complex as it would 
 
15See, Park and Philippopoulos (2005). 
16 See for example, Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), Rioja (1999), Rivas (2003), Turnovsky (2004), and 
Agénor (2012). 
17See for example,  Rebelo (1991), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), 
Turnovsky (2000a). 
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require the introduction of an additional variable such as expenditures on maintenance of 
stock of public capital. It is mostly believed that the tradeoff between stock and flow 
variable treatment of public expenditures is more of a choice between analytical tractability 
and scope of research. Furthermore, flow and stock treatment have been shown to yield 
empirically similar results in most cases [Posada, et al. (2015)]. 
The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas which can be written as: 
       
    … … … … … … … (4) 
We assume that government expenditure on the two types of public expenditures is 
financed contemporaneously by a flat-rate income tax: 
         … … … … … … … (5) 
Where   is tax rate.  
Now let    
  
 ⁄  and    
  
 ⁄  be the shares of productivity enhancing 
expenditure and utility enhancing expenditure respectively in national output. Then the 
budget constraint can be written as: 
        … … … … … … … (6)  
Taking        and    as given, the representative agent chooses consumption   and 
capital   to maximise: 
                
       … … … … … (7) 
Subject to  ̇             
       … … … … (8) 
Where Equation (8) defines investment as after-tax output less consumption. 
Solving the optimisation problem using optimal control methods yields the following 
growth equation of the economy. 
      (       ) (  )
   
 ⁄     … … … … (9) 
According to Equation (9), the growth rate depends on the output elasticities with 
respect to private capital and public good, composition of public spending, and discount rate. 
 
4.  A BENCHMARK CASE WITH NO RENT-SEEKING 
For comparative purposes, we first examine a benchmark case when the 
composition of public spending is exogenous and there is no rent-seeking. First, we 
explore the impact of an increase in the ratio of productivity enhancing public spending 
on economic growth. Differentiating Equation (9) with respect to     
  
   
⁄                
 
 ⁄      
   
 ⁄   … … … (10) 
Slight manipulation shows that: 
  
   
⁄    if               
     … … … … (11) 
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Where               
   is the after tax marginal product of productivity enhancing 
goods and services and   is the output elasticity of capital. 
Proposition 1: An exogenous increase in the share of productivity enhancing 
public spending will have a positive impact on economic growth as long as the after tax 
marginal product of productivity enhancing goods and services is greater than the output 
elasticity of capital.  
An increase in productivity enhancing spending directly raises the productive 
capacity of the economy which contributes positively to economic growth. However, as the 
share of utility enhancing spending is held constant, an increase in the share of productivity 
enhancing spending necessitates an increase in the tax rate which reduces output and hence 
capital. So as long as the contribution of the productivity enhancing spending outweighs the 
loss in output caused by decline in capital, economic growth would increase. This result has 
an important implication. Even if public spending is concentrated on productivity 
enhancing goods and services, economic growth would only accrue when the contribution 
of such goods and services in terms of their marginal productivity is high enough so as to 
outweigh potential loss of output as a result of increase in taxation. This implies that 
government may have to prioritise its spending in terms of allocating budget to those public 
goods and services which have the highest potential to raise productivity. For example, the 
government may choose to invest in physical infrastructure such as roads, railways and 
bridges as such investments are likely to substantially raise productivity and hence boost 
economic growth. Similarly, public spending on education and health may significantly 
boost productivity and hence economic growth. 
The theory suggests that the public expenditures have both short run demand 
effects as well as long run supply effects. However the magnitude of these effects 
depends on many factors such as efficiency of public investment that affects the long run 
elasticity of output with respect to public expenditure and how public spending is 
financed such as taxes. 
By explicitly referring to these magnitudes the proposition (1) suggests that 
beyond the share of public expenditures the government also controls other policy 
instruments such as tax rate which govern the total size of public intervention in the spirit 
of Devarajan, et al. (1996). These results essentially describe how the growth effects of 
public good provision may be mediated by the changes it induces in marginal 
productivity of capital and its magnitude in relation to the elasticity of capital. 
Next, we differentiate Equation (9) with respect to    to obtain: 
  
   
⁄       
   
 ⁄    … … … … … (12) 
Proposition 2: An exogenous increase in the share of utility enhancing public 
spending will have a negative impact on economic growth. 
The above result follows from the fact that an increase in utility enhancing 
spending does not add to the productive capacity of the economy but has to be financed 
by taxes which negatively affect the growth rate.
18
 Furthermore, the impact on growth 
 
18 In a similar vein, Barro (1990) argues that government consumption necessitates higher taxes which 
introduce distortions in the economy and hence negatively impact economic growth. See also Grier and Tullock 
(1989). 
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rate will be more pronounced the higher is the output elasticity of capital. This result 
serves to underscore the fact that the impact of public spending on economic growth 
depends on the type of public spending which must be taken into account while analysing 
public spending-growth nexus. In contrast to the counterintuitive findings of Devarajan, 
et al. (1996) which suggest that switching public spending from investment to 
consumption would promote economic growth, our result is more plausible and captures 
the idea that consumption related public spending would hamper economic growth by 
pulling resources away from productivity enhancing public investments, a point also 
highlighted by Gupta, et al. (2001).  
 
5.  PUBLIC SPENDING, BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY  
AND RENT-SEEKING 
We now introduce the bureaucratic choice to endogenise the composition of public 
spending in terms of bureaucratic quality and the associated issue of rent-seeking. We 
assume that a representative bureaucrat chooses the composition of public spending to 
maximise the following weighted utility function: 
                                     … … … (13) 
Subject to          … … … … … … (14) 
Where           is the utility of the representative consumer, the parameter 
  captures bureaucratic quality, and      is the proportion of    extracted by the 
bureaucrat as rent which is assumed to be a function of bureaucratic quality. We assume 
that the extent of rent-seeking declines with the bureaucratic quality and hence       
We suppose that         with higher values of   reflecting better quality of 
bureaucracy. The higher is the bureaucratic quality, the higher is the weight attached to 
the maximisation of social welfare by the bureaucrat. On the other hand, with weak 
institutions the bureaucracy is likely to be geared less towards maximisation of social 
welfare and more towards rent-seeking activities. We assume that only productivity 
enhancing spending is prone to rent-seeking. This is plausible because spending on 
physical infrastructure is often non-transparent and complex creating possibilities for 
rent-seeking.
19
 On the other hand public consumption expenditures such as wages and 
salaries are quite transparent and offer little chance for rent-seeking. The solution of the 
above optimisation problem yields the following values for    and   :  
   
   
          ⁄   … … … … … (15) 
      
   
          ⁄  … … … … … (16) 
Slight manipulation yields: 
   
   
            ⁄   … … … … … (17) 
 
19
This assumption also lends analytical tractability to the model by simplifying the analysis. While 
relaxing these assumptions may change the inner dynamics of the model with more complex derivations, it will 
likely not change the major thrust of the theoretical arguments and overall direction of the conclusions.    
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            ⁄  … … … … … (18) 
It is clear from Equations (17) and (18) that for a given level of income, both    
and    are functions of bureaucratic quality directly as well as indirectly through its 
influence on rent-seeking, i.e.: 
              … … … … … … (19) 
               … … … … … … (20) 
The above equations can be used to derive the following result (see Appendix for 
detailed derivations). 
Proposition 3: An improvement in bureaucratic quality will increase the share of 
utility enhancing public spending while squeezing the share of spending on productivity 
enhancing goods and services. 
With strong institutions and better quality bureaucracy, the policy-makers would 
be more inclined to maximise social welfare and thus public spending will be tilted 
towards public goods and services that lead to maximisation of social welfare. In this 
case, public spending will be channelled more into utility enhancing public goods and 
services because these entail no rent-seeking and raise the level of welfare. On the other 
hand, with weak institutions and poor accountability the opportunity cost of extracting 
rents is low so bureaucrats have an incentive to allocate public spending towards those 
expenditures that maximise rents rather than social welfare. In this case, since 
productivity enhancing public spending is prone to rent-seeking, such spending will 
increase to maximise rents. Similarly, more rent-seeking opportunities will curtail utility 
enhancing spending and expand public spending on productivity enhancing goods and 
services. 
How do these impacts translate into changes in economic growth? To see this, we 
plug Equations (19) and (20) in the growth Equation (9) to obtain: 
      (                 ) (       )
   
 ⁄     … … (21) 
Now we can investigate how variations in the parameters of bureaucratic quality 
and rent-seeking impact economic growth through their impact on the composition of 
public spending (see Appendix for detailed derivations). 
Proposition 4: The impact of an improvement in bureaucratic quality on economic 
growth depends on the relative magnitudes of changes in the shares of utility enhancing 
and productivity enhancing spending resulting from an improvement in bureaucratic 
quality.  
The above result shows the importance of explicitly recognising the role of 
bureaucratic quality in the process of economic growth. It is generally believed that an 
improvement in bureaucratic quality will be beneficial for economic growth. However, 
our results show that this may not be necessarily the case because bureaucratic quality 
and the associated problem of rent-seeking affect the composition of public spending in 
different ways which may result in different implications for economic growth. To see 
this, observe that the impact on economic growth is composed of two opposing forces. 
On the one hand, there is an allocation effect whereby an improvement in bureaucratic 
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quality leads to an increase in the share of utility enhancing spending and a reduction in 
productivity enhancing spending both of which constrain economic growth. On the other 
hand, an improvement in bureaucratic quality leads to an efficiency effect which reduces 
the bureaucratic extraction in the productivity enhancing spending thus freeing up 
resources that can be deployed for increasing production which spurs economic growth. 
So the net impact of an improvement in bureaucratic quality on economic growth 
depends on the relative magnitudes of changes in the two types of public spending. More 
importantly, the impact of bureaucratic quality on economic growth depends on how 
strongly an improvement in bureaucratic quality curtails the incentives for rent-seeking. 
For example, strong institutions and robust mechanisms for monitoring and 
accountability can be very effective in checking the rent-seeking behaviour, as argued by 
Uppal (2011) in the case of Pakistan. In this case, an improvement in bureaucratic quality 
will be likely to produce favorable growth outcomes. In contrast, as argued by Kimenyi 
and Tollison (1999), weak institutions may permit diversion of resources to wasteful rent-
seeking activities thus contributing to adverse public policy outcomes. 
A significant body of literature emphasises the role of institutional quality in ensuring 
positive growth outcomes of public policies [see, for example, Acemoglu (2005) and Keefer 
(2002)]. In economies with good governance and effective checks and balances on 
institutions, public spending tends to be productively used thus contributing positively to 
economic growth. However, in economies with bad governance, public spending is not 
deployed productively and is rather often used as an instrument for maximising rents by 
bureaucrats and politicians [Keefer (2002)]. The governments tend to be responsive to its 
citizens in terms of provision of soft public goods such as property rights, and rule of law in 
countries where institutions are strong and provide right incentives for government officials to 
cater to the demands of the citizens [Keefer (2004)]. However, in economies with weak 
institutions rent-seeking opportunities are pervasive and are often linked to the size of public 
sector [Ott (2005)]. If incentives for rent-seeking are sufficiently high, the size of public 
investment would be strongly associated with rent-seeking as public officials would have an 
incentive to undertake public investment to maximise their rents. As our analysis suggests, 
such investments may be counterproductive if quality of the bureaucracy is low implying 
strong incentive for rent-seeking in the public sector. 
One implication of the model developed in this paper is that rent-seeking 
governments may actually deliver high economic growth by channeling resources into 
public investments that offer more rent-seeking opportunities while also raising 
productive capacity of the economy. However, this can only come at the cost of potential 
loss in public welfare as resources are diverted from utility enhancing public spending.
20
 
This issue has been debated in the policy circles as well as in the academic literature and 
a number of empirical studies show that the link between democratic institutions and 
economic growth is tenuous [Rioja (1999); Rivas (2003)]. 
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has analysed the relationship between public spending and economic 
growth by developing a model that explicitly incorporates quality of bureaucracy with the 
 
20 The author is thankful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
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possibility of rent-seeking behaviour, and that distinguishes between utility enhancing 
and productivity enhancing public spending. In the benchmark case of no rent-seeking, 
the paper shows that even when public spending is channelled into productivity 
enhancing goods and services it may not achieve the desired growth outcomes if the 
marginal productivity of such spending is low. We show that economic growth would 
result only if marginal productivity of public spending is high enough so as to outweigh 
the potential loss of output as a result of increase in taxation. This highlights the need for 
prioritising public spending and allocating resources to public goods and services that 
have the potential to raise productivity. In the presence of rent-seeking motives, it is 
shown that while an improvement in bureaucratic quality would unambiguously raise the 
share of utility enhancing public spending, its impact on economic growth would depend 
on how bureaucratic quality influences the relative magnitudes of the two types of public 
spending as well as on how far bureaucratic extraction will be curtailed as a result of 
improvement in bureaucratic quality. In cases where bureaucratic reforms create strong 
institutions and effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms, bureaucratic 
extraction is likely to be minimised and public spending is more likely to foster economic 
growth.   
A key limitation of the analysis is that rent-seeking is assumed to take place only 
in productivity enhancing public spending. Though this is a plausible assumption, future 
work may focus on extending the model to incorporate rent-seeking in the utility 
enhancing spending on goods and services. Also, though the tradeoff between economic 
growth and public welfare is not the focus of the paper, maximisation of economic 
growth by the policymakers at the expense of public welfare is not endorsed by the paper. 
Finally, we have assumed that bureaucratic quality affects economic growth only 
indirectly through the composition of public spending. However, bureaucratic quality 
may also directly affect economic growth through an improvement in overall policy and 
regulatory environment that may raise total factor productivity in the economy. The 




Derivations for Propositions 1 and 2 
The optimisation problem can be solved in terms of the current value Hamiltonian 
which is given by: 
              
                 
       … … … (A1)  
Where         … … … … … … (A2) 
First Order Conditions 
  
  
    ⁄    
                 ⁄  … … … … (A3) 
 ̇   
  
  
  ̇                                  
      … (A4) 
Equation (A4) simplifies to: 
 ̇                   
       … … … … … (A5) 
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Differentiating (A3) with respect to time, we have: 
 ̇    ̇   ⁄  … … … … … … … (A6) 
Substituting (A3) and (A6) in (A5), we obtain:   
 ̇
 ⁄            
      
       … … … … (A7) 
Where   denotes steady state per capita growth rate of private consumption. 
In this model the economy is always at a steady state growth in which all variables 
    and   grow at the rate   shown in Equation (A7).  
Now notice that: 
        … … … … … … … (A8) 
Substituting (A8) in (A7) we have: 
  [                   
     ] … … … … (A9) 
Now notice that: 
       
    … … … … … … … (A10) 
Slight manipulation of (A10) yields: 
        
   
 ⁄  … … … … … … … (A11) 
Substituting (A11) into (A10), we have: 
                   
    (    
   
 ⁄ )
   
    … … … (A12) 
Simplifying this expression we have: 
            (  )
   
 ⁄     … … … … … (A13) 
On substituting for         we have: 
      (       ) (  )
   
 ⁄     … … … … (A14) 
According to (A14), the growth rate depends on the output elasticities with respect 
to private capital and public good, composition of public spending, and discount rate. 
 
Derivation of Equations (15) and (16) in the Text 
Consider the following optimisation problem: 
                                     … … … (A15)    
Subject to          … … … … … … (A16) 
Forming the Lagrangian function: 
                      (       )              … (A17) 
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    … … … … … … … (A18) 
Similarly, differentiating with respect to    gives: 
              … … … … … … (A19) 
From (A18) and A(19) we obtain: 
   
   
          ⁄  … … … … … .. (A20) 
Which is Equation (15) reported in the main text. 
Plugging (A20) into (A16) we obtain: 
      
   
          ⁄  … … … … … (A21) 
Which is Equation (16) reported in the main text. 
 
Derivations for Proposition 3 
Differentiating Equations (19) and (20) reported in the main text yield the 
following expressions.  
   
  ⁄  
                                
               ⁄     (A22) 
   
  
⁄  
                                 
               ⁄    … (A23) 
 
Derivations for Proposition 4: 
Taking derivative of Equation (21) with respect to   we have: 
  
  ⁄    [      (
   
  
⁄ )   (
   
  
⁄  
   
  ⁄ )] … … (A24) 
Where  
           
   
 ⁄ (                 )           
     … (A25) 
The signs of the derivatives inside the brackets of (A24) are as in (A22) and (A23). 
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